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If You Can't Say Something Nice, Don't Say Anything at All: Hill
v. Colorado and the Antiabortion1 Protest Controversy
I. INTRODUCTION
Abortion. The very word evokes an emotional reaction in every
American's conscience. The topic of abortion remains one of the most
hotly debated and controversial issues in modern society, despite more
than twenty years of contention since the landmark decision of Roe v.
Wade.2 The United States Supreme Court has attempted in many deci-
sions to create a jurisprudence maintaining individual freedom to per-
form or seek an abortion, while simultaneously allowing the debate
about abortion to rage on as a moral or political issue. In Hill v. Colo-
rado,3 these two concerns collided. This decision represents the most
current opinion regarding the redheaded stepchildren of First Amend-
ment freedom: abortion clinic protestors, and their ability to express
antiabortion views to patients entering abortion clinics for treatment.
The Hill decision addressed a Colorado statute that restricted protest
around medical facilities. This statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122,
enacted in 1993, was a legislative effort unprecedented in the history
of the abortion debate. In order to understand this ruling, one must
first look at the history of First Amendment jurisprudence in the area
of abortion protest.
II. BACKGROUND OF ANTI-ABORTION SPEECH RESTRICTIONS
A. Restrictions on Speech Generally
The First Amendment's admonition that "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech"4 has been cited since the
birth of our country as evidence that special protection exists for the
promulgation of ideas and opinions, especially on matters of political
or otherwise social concern. This admonition against congressional
action has been extended to the individual states, through the power of
1. Throughout this note, the term "antiabortion" will be used to refer to
individuals who express a disagreement with the abortion procedure. This term is
meant to include those individuals who proclaim themselves to be "pro-life".
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000).
4. U.S. Const. amend. I.
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the Fourteenth Amendment.5 However, subsequent case law has
demonstrated that not all speech is protected equally. Some types of
speech recognized as being vulnerable to greater government interfer-
ence and restraint are fighting words,6 untruthful or misleading com-
mercial speech,7 defamation," and obscenity. 9 If the government
attempts to restrict any speech outside of these categories, it must
comport with exacting limitations in order to protect against the possi-
bility of governmental censure of unpopular ideas.1 ° In particular,
"protest" speech has been especially guarded, unless accompanied by
other inseparable and lawless behavior. 1
B. Abortion Protest
Since the Roe v. Wade decision effecting legalized abortion, a small
but significant portion of the American public has chosen to actively
protest the availability of abortion services. These vocal and some-
times strident opponents of the abortion procedure have often claimed
First Amendment protection of their speech. Many abortion protes-
tors, such as the petitioners in Hill v. Colorado, confine their protest to
counseling potentially abortion-bound women immediately outside of
abortion clinics. This area around abortion clinics has become a mod-
ern war zone in many cities and communities. There have been many
occasions on which anti-abortion protestors outside of clinics have
clashed with pro-abortion commentators, clients, and escorts or family
members of clients as they attempt to enter for medical services.' 2
Many commentators suggest that the media's sensationalism of
violence has led to a false impression regarding abortion protestors
and their activities around the clinics. 13 In all fairness to abortion
5. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), which established that the first
eight amendments to the Constitution were incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and hence were enforceable against the States.
6. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
7. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
8. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
9. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973).
10. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
11. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
12. For statistics regarding specific acts of violence, please refer to the Annual
Report on Clinic Violence, produced by the National Abortion Federation. The Report is
available at: www.prochoice.org.
13. For comments on the non-violent activities of Antiabortion protestors, see Mary
Ann Glendon, When Words Cheapen Life, N.Y.Times, June 10,1995, at A19. Also, see
118 [Vol. 23:117
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protestors, these situations are not "the norm". Most protestors, such
as the petitioners in Hill v. Colorado, confine themselves to a more
peaceful method of protest, finding it more effective as a form of com-
munication. A newspaper or television journalist, however, is not
likely to videotape or otherwise report on a peaceful protest composed
of abortion opponents standing in a circle and offering a prayer-such
events are not usually considered newsworthy. The shouting, pushing,
insults, and threats of violence are not everyday happenings, but these
violent actions do occur among a handful of antiabortion protestors.
Unfortunately, these violent protestors are the type with which Ameri-
cans are most familiar.
C. Federal Legislation
In recognition of the potential for intense disagreement amongst
protestors and abortion clients or supporters, the U.S. Congress
enacted the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) in
1994.14 This Act made physical obstruction or the use of force or threat
of force to injure, intimidate, or interfere with anyone seeking repro-
ductive health services a federal crime.' 5 In addition, the FACE Act
also provides for civil lawsuits for violations of the act. 16 This law rein-
forced the ideal that women seeking reproductive counseling should be
provided the opportunity to enter a clinic without suffering from vio-
lence immediately outside the building. The need for federal protec-
tion of women was seen as a necessary step to reduce actual or
perceived violence directed toward women seeking abortion-related
services.
D. Injunctions
Several cases have dealt with the problem of abortion clinic pro-
tests that have been curtailed by judicial injunctions. The two main
cases are Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. 7 and Schenck v. Pro-
Choice Network of Western New York.'
Lynn D. Wardle, The Quandary of Pro-Life Free Speech: A Lesson from the Abolitionists,
62 Alb. L. Rev. 853 (1999).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1999).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
18. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
20001 119
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1. Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.
The Madsen controversy arose from abortion protest activity
outside a clinic located in Melbourne, Florida.19 The operators of the
health clinic had previously requested and received an injunction
prohibiting the interference of public access to the clinic, as well as
physical abuse of those entering or leaving the clinic. 20 However, little
progress was made by the first injunction, and the clinic operators
requested a broader injunction upon the protest activities. 21 The sec-
ond injunction had several more restrictive provisions, including: (1) a
36-foot buffer zone around all clinic entrances and driveways; (2) a
restriction on excessive noisemaking within earshot of patients inside
the clinic; (3) a restriction on use of "images observable" by patients
inside the clinic; (4) a prohibition on approach by protestors towards
clients and patients within a 300-foot zone without consent; and (5) a
300-foot buffer zone around the clinic staffs residences. 22 The
antiabortion protestors at the clinic claimed this injunction violated
their free speech rights.23
The Supreme Court used a content-neutral test in Madsen to deter-
mine the constitutionality of the injunction.24 The Court dismissed the
protestors' claim that the injunction was a content-based restriction,
stating that every injunction, because it rests on prior behavior of an
identifiable group, must by its definition affect only one group or view-
point.25 Although the injunction was content-neutral, the Court was
forced to create a new test for its constitutionality. The Court found
the Ward test,2 6 which measured time, place, and manner restrictions
in traditional public forums, to be lacking in this instance. The stan-
19. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757.
20. Id. at 758.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 759-62.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See id.at 762. (The Court stated: "An injunction, by its very nature, applies
only to a particular group ... because of the group's past actions in the context of a
specific dispute .... ").
26. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 791 (1989). The test utilized in
Ward questioned whether a regulation "was narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest" and whether the restriction would "leave ample alternative
channels of communication open." See id. at 796, 802. The Supreme Court explained
this test further: "Lest any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm today that a
regulation of the time, place, and manner of protected speech must be narrowly
tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests, but that it need
not be the least restrictive means of doing so." Id. at 798.
[Vol. 23:117120
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dard of Ward, although appropriate for a statute, did not provide
review stringent enough for an injunction.27 Accordingly, the Court
adopted a modified standard: "We must ask instead whether the chal-
lenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than neces-
sary to serve a significant government interest. "28 In evaluating the
second injunction, the Court found that the limitation on noise, as
well as the 36-foot buffer zone around clinic entrances, burdened no
more speech than necessary, and these provisions were found
constitutional.29
Several provisions of the injunction failed the Court's new test.
The limitation on images observable was deemed overly restrictive, as
clinics could take action to protect patients inside without burdening
the protestors' speech by simply drawing their curtains.30 In addition,
the Court struck down the 300-foot "no approach" zone, which
required consent before a protestor could approach anyone entering
the clinic.31 The Court stated: "Absent evidence that the protesters'
speech is independendy proscribable (e.g., 'fighting words' or threats),
or is so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat
of physical harm this provision cannot stand."3 2 This 300-foot area,
commonly referred to as a "floating" buffer zone, was considered to
burden "more speech than necessary to prevent intimidation and to
ensure access to the clinic."' 33 While the 36-foot fixed buffer zone pre-
vented speech near clinic entrances and thus helped ensure that
protestors would not obstruct access or block traffic, the floating
buffer zone served no such readily identifiable purpose.34
27. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764-65. (The Court stated: "Injunctions... carry greater
risks of censorship and discriminatory application than do general ordinances ....
We believe these differences require a somewhat more stringent application of general
First Amendment principles . .
28. Id. at 765.
29. Id. at 768, 772.
30. Id. at 773.
31. Id. at 773-74.
32. Id. at 774. (citation omitted).
33. Id. The term "buffer zone" implies the creation of an area where protest speech
is not permitted. Here, the Supreme Court refused to create a 300-foot floating buffer
zone (a non-speech zone which moves with a particular person as they move), but
allowed the 36-foot fixed buffer zone (a non-speech zone with a radius determined by
a fixed object, such as a building) to stand.
34. Id. In the subsequent analysis of the 300-foot buffer zone around clinic staffs
residences, the Court stated: "The record before us does not contain sufficient
justification for this broad ban on picketing; it appears that a limitation on the time,
duration of picketing, and number of pickets outside a smaller zone could have
accomplished the desired result." Id. at 775. While the Court simply stated the 300-
20001
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2. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York
The Schenck case contained significant factual differences from
Madsen, although it also came about as a result of controversial
antiabortion protesting. However, Schenck involved two abortion clin-
ics in Rochester and Buffalo, New York 35 which had been "subjected to
numerous large-scale blockades"'36 by protestors. The clinic operators
first sought a temporary restraining order, and later an injunction, fol-
lowing violation of the restraining order by antiabortion protestors.3 7
The injunction carried several provisions restricting the protestors'
First Amendment speech freedoms, including a "fixed" buffer zone
prohibiting protest within fifteen feet of doorways, parking lot
entrances, or driveways of abortion clinics. 8 In addition, the injunc-
tion also contained a restriction called a "floating" buffer zone, which
banned protest within fifteen feet of "any person or vehicle. . . leaving
such facilities". 39 Perhaps the most controversial portion of the injunc-
tive order, the "cease and desist" provision, stated that any protestor
entering either buffer zone had to immediately stop counseling or pro-
testing and retreat to a distance of fifteen feet before resuming her
speech.40
In analyzing the Schenck case, the Court utilized the test for con-
stitutionality of injunctions regarding a traditional public forum devel-
oped in Madsen: "whether the challenged provisions of the injunction
burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant govern-
ment interest."'4 1 The Court looked at the private claims asserted in
the complaint by the operators of the health clinic, as well as the gov-
ernment's interests, which included an interest in public safety and
order.42 Also asserted were interests in "promoting the free flow of traf-
fic on streets and sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting
a woman's freedom to seek pregnancy-related services."
43
foot floating zone around persons entering the clinic was "broader than necessary", it
offered no reasoning for this holding, other than the lack of "infusion with violence" or
being "independently proscribable." Id. at 774.
35. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 361
(1997).
36. Id. at 362.
37. Id. at 365-66.
38. Id. at 367.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 371 (quoting Madsen 512 U.S. at 765).
42. Id. at 375.
43. Id. at 376.
[Vol. 23:117
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In contemplating these interests, the Court concluded that the
fixed buffer zone provision met constitutional standards.44 The Court
stated that these restrictions on the movement or location of the
antiabortion protestors were "necessary to ensure that people and vehi-
cles trying to enter or exit the clinic property ... can do so."'45 Thus,
the coexistence of a significant government interest in safety and
access, as well as a history of prior disruptive and dangerous conduct
by protestors, justified the restriction on speech created by the fixed
buffer zone.46
The floating buffer zone provision, however, was struck down by
the Court as burdening "more speech than is necessary to serve the
relevant governmental interests. '47 After commenting upon the diffi-
culty of balancing the speech interests of the antiabortion protestors in
a traditional public forum (public sidewalks) and the history of physi-
cally abusive and harassing conduct, the Court struck the floating
buffer zone because of practical enforcement concerns. 4" The Court
reasoned that the difficulty of determining and maintaining a fifteen-
foot distance while a protestor counseled a potential abortion clinic
client may lead to inadvertent violations.49 In addition, uncertainty
regarding compliance with the injunction's floating buffer zone might
lead to a "chilling effect" which would unnecessarily reduce speech out
of a fear of violating the court's order.50
The "cease and desist" provision, however, was not discussed
extensively by the Court.5 1 However, the Court did make clear that the
"cease" clause was not grounds for proclaiming the entire injunction
unconstitutional as a content-based restriction, but rather was a result
of the protestors' prior conduct.52 In addition, the Court proclaimed
that this injunction, as well as the order discussed in Madsen, could
44. Id. at 380.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 377.
48. Id. at 377-78.
49. Id. at 378. The Supreme Court went on to reinforce the difficulty of
compliance with the floating buffer zone provision, stating: "Since there may well be
other ways to both effect such separation and yet provide certainty (so that speech
protected by the injunction's terms is not burdened), we conclude that the floating
buffer zones burden more speech than necessary to serve the relevant governmental
interests." Id. at 378-79.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 379.
52. Id. at 384-385.
20001
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not be justified "on the basis of any generalized right 'to be left alone'
on a public street or sidewalk"., 3
Thus, the law as developed in the injunction cases of Schenck and
Madsen, as well as in the federal legislation (FACE Act), seemed to
establish a recognizable pattern of balance amongst the rights of abor-
tion clinic patients and antiabortion protestors. The right of access to
abortion clinics was a heavily guarded commodity, accompanied by
federal criminal and civil penalties for interference. This right could
be adequately protected in most cases by fixed buffer zones disallow-
ing protest within a reasonable distance from clinic entrances. How-
ever, the speech rights of antiabortion protestors were not subjected to
excessive restriction, for all forms of floating buffer zones that reached
the Supreme Court, as well as consent or "cease and desist" provisions,
were immediately struck as forbidding too much speech. 4 The two
interests involved appeared to be evenly, or at least comfortably, bal-
anced. The scales were readjusted, however, when the Court handed
down its decision in Hill v. Colorado.
Ill. HILL V. COLORADO: THE CASE
A. Factual Background
The Colorado General Assembly enacted Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-
122 in 1993, which provides in pertinent part:
The general assembly ... declares that it is appropriate to enact legisla-
tion that prohibits a person from knowingly obstructing another per-
son's entry to or exit from a health care facility .... No person shall
knowingly approach another person within eight feet of such person,
unless such other person consents, for the purpose of passing a leaflet
or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, educa-
tion, or counseling with such other person in the public way or side-
walk area within a radius of one hundred feet from any entrance door
to a health care facility. Any person who violates this subsection...
commits a class 3 misdemeanor. 55
Prior to the adoption of this statute, several hearings were conducted
before the House and Senate Judiciary Committees of the General
Assembly of Colorado. 6 These hearings largely consisted of testimony
regarding "the conduct of some antiabortion protestors at various med-
53. Id. at 383 (quoting Madsen 512 U.S. at 753).
54. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 377; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 774.
55. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-122 (West 1999).
56. Hill v. City of Lakewood, 911 P.2d 670, 672 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996), affd sub
nom. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000).
124 [Vol. 23:117
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ical clinics directed both at patients and staff."' 57 The testimony
revealed antiabortion protestors' efforts to deny access to clinic
entrances, as well as other harassing conduct.58 The Committees also
heard testimony regarding both the impossibility of enforcing any type
of crowd control outside of such clinics, and the fear potential clients
felt for their safety when attempting to enter for medical advice.59
The petitioners in this case, Leila Hill, Audrey Himmelmann, and
Everitt Simpson, are morally opposed to the practice of human abor-
tion.60 To express their opinion and combat the "evil" of abortion, the
petitioners participated in what they called "sidewalk counseling".6 1
This practice consisted of educating, counseling, or otherwise per-
suading "passersby about abortion and abortion alternatives through
leafleting, sign displays, conversation, and other means. ' 62 These activ-
ities took place on public ways and sidewalks near abortion clinics.63
The petitioners were never charged with any violent activity regarding
their protest or sidewalk counseling.64 These protestors, through years
of experience, deemed compliance with the statute difficult, for they
felt it was almost impossible to remain on the sidewalk, at least eight
feet away from others, while continuing their oral protest or counsel-
ing.65 In reaction to the difficulties created by the statute, the petition-
ers altered their manner of protest to avoid arrest.66
B. Procedural History
1. Request for Injunction by the District Court of Jefferson County,
Colorado
A few months after the statute was enacted by the General Assem-
bly, petitioners brought an action which claimed that Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-9-122(3) violated the First Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution on its face. Petitioner's action requested a permanent injunc-
tion against enforcement of the statute by government officials of
57. Id. at 672.
58. Id.
59. Brief for Respondents at 1, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-
1856).
60. Brief for Petitioners at 2, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-
1856).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 3.
65. Hill v. City of Lakewood, 911 P.2d 670, 673 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
66. Brief for Petitioners at 4, Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (No. 98-
1856).
2000]
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Colorado.67 The District Court of Jefferson County granted summary
judgment for respondents, denied the injunction, and held that the
statute did not violate the First Amendment.
68
2. Colorado Court of Appeals (Part I)
The petitioners appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which
upheld the trial court's denial of the injunction.69 The Court of
Appeals determined that the statute was a content-neutral restriction
because it was not directed exclusively at antiabortion protestors or
their viewpoint.7" In analyzing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122, the Court
of Appeals applied the traditional test for time, place, and manner
restrictions on speech in a traditional public forum. 71 The Court held
the statute constitutional under the requirements of the Ward test: (1)
the statute advanced a significant government interest in safety and
access; (2) the statute did not burden speech more than was reasona-
bly necessary because protestors could continue to communicate,
albeit at a greater distance; and (3) the statute allowed for ample alter-
native channels for communication, as it did not restrict the use of
signs, posters, or communication outside the eight-foot buffer zone.
72
The court dismissed petitioners' claim that the statute was vague, as all
terms in the statute were afforded meaning via the Colorado Criminal
Code or common usage.73 In addition, the court rejected petitioners'
contention that the statute represented a prior restraint on speech for
the reason that refusal to "license" protest speech rested upon private
citizens rather than a government entity. 74 The Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's denial of an injunction against the stat-
ute's enforcement, declaring the statute to be constitutional with no
First Amendment violations.75
67. Hill v. City of Lakewood, 911 P.2d at 672-73.
68. Id. at 670.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 673. The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that "§ 18-9-122(3) is
content-neutral because the specific viewpoint of any person who protests at a health
care facility is not relevant to a determination whether a violation of the statute has
occurred." Id.
71. Id. at 673-74.
72. Id. at 674.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 674-75.
75. Id. at 672.
[Vol. 23:117
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3. Colorado Court of Appeals (Part II)
Following the unfavorable disposition of their case by the Colo-
rado Court of Appeals, petitioners applied for certiorari by the United
States Supreme Court. 76 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,
vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Colorado Court of
Appeals for further consideration in light of Schenck v. Pro-Choice Net-
work of Western New York. 77
The Colorado Court of Appeals again affirmed the District
Court's denial of an injunction against enforcement of the statute.78
After consideration of the Schenck decision, the Court of Appeals
determined that the First Amendment analysis of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-
9-122 was unchanged. 79 The Court of Appeals maintained that the
statute was a "content-neutral, generally applicable statute supported
by a valid governmental interest" which provided ample alternative
methods for communication. 0 The court declared the interest of
ensuring access to health clinics to be a sufficient government inter-
est.81 In addition, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' com-
plaints about the practical difficulty of complying with the statute due
to an inability to accurately estimate distance by stating that the scien-
ter requirement ("knowingly approach") of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122
protected inadvertent violators from prosecution. 2
4. The Supreme Court of Colorado
The petitioners appealed the trial court's denial of the injunction
to the Colorado Supreme Court. The Colorado Supreme Court first
carefully weighed of the interests involved for both the petitioners and
the State of Colorado.83 The court found that, although the First
Amendment did restrain the government's attempts to prohibit speech,
the protections afforded did not outweigh the State's interests.8 4 The
court reemphasized the General Assembly's determination that the
76. After the Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's denial of an
injunction, the petitioners requested an en banc review of the decision. En banc review
by the Court of Appeals was denied, as was certiorari by the Colorado Supreme Court.
Therefore, the petitioners requested certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.
77. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
78. Hill v. City of Lakewood, 949 P.2d 107, 108 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
79. Id. at 110.
80. Id. at 109-10.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 110.
83. Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1252 (Colo. 1999), affid sub nom. Hill v.
Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000).
84. Id.
2000]
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right of access to counseling and treatment at medical facilities was
paramount."' Expanding upon that finding, the Colorado Supreme
Court determined that the right of access was contained within a
greater "right to be let alone" or a generalized right to privacy.8 6 After
reasoning that privacy rights had generally included pregnancy or
child-rearing decisions, 7 the court concluded:
the First Amendment can accommodate reasonable government action
intended to effectuate the free exercise of another fundamental right,
an individual's right to privacy, here represented by access to medical
counseling and treatment.88
The Colorado Supreme Court determined that the holding in Schenck
was inapplicable to the analysis of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122, because
Schenck dealt with the constitutionality of an injunction. 9 Since the
injunction was judicially created, the test for constitutionality in
Schenck was necessarily harsher because of a greater risk of censorship
and discriminatory application. 90 In addition, the Colorado Supreme
Court denied the applicability of Sabelko v. City of Phoenix, claiming it
was sufficiently factually distinct to render it useless. 91 Instead of the
harsh injunction standard, the court chose to use the Ward test for
time, place, and manner restrictions, after determining the statute was
content-neutral.92 The statute met the requirement of being "narrowly
drawn" as it contained the "knowingly approach" clause, which pro-
85. Id. at 1252-53.
86. Id. at 1253. The Colorado Supreme Court held individuals have a "right to be
let alone", although the United States Supreme Court had denied this right as a basis
for the injunction in Schenck. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New
York, 519 U.S. 357, 361 (1997). The Colorado court justified reliance on the right to
be let alone as a basis for their decision here because of the treatment of reproductive
privacy rights in cases such as Roe v. Wade.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1255.
91. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court discussed the ruling in Sabelko v. City of
Phoenix, 120 F.3d 161 (9th Cir. 1997), which involved a city ordinance creating an
eight-foot floating buffer zone around persons entering an abortion clinic. However,
unlike the present statute's buffer zone and consent requirement, the city ordinance
required a protestor to withdraw if an entering client came within eight feet of the
protestor. Thus, in addition to the negative requirement of staying outside an eight-foot
zone, the protestors in Sabelko were also subject to a positive requirement to move
away upon request, even if the protestor was standing still. In Hill, the statute
contained no such requirement, as it only'affected "approach" by protestors.
92. Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d at 1256.
[Vol. 23:117128
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tected innocent or inadvertent violation.93 In addition, the government
interest in providing for the health and safety of potential clients of
health clinics was deemed to be sufficient to justify the regulation on
petitioners' speech. 94 Finally, the statute left open ample alternative
channels for speech, although it did deter leafleting somewhat. 95 The
Colorado Supreme Court also dismissed the possibility of chilled
speech.96 The statute satisfied the Ward test as applied by the Colorado
Supreme Court, and was thus deemed to be a constitutional restriction
on speech.97 Again the petitioners were denied their request for an
injunction against the statute's enforcement.98 The petitioners applied
for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which was granted
in September of 1999. 99
C. Majority Opinion of the United States Supreme Court
On June 28, 2000, the United States Supreme Court released its
decision regarding the Hill v. Colorado case. 100 This majority decision,
written by Justice Stevens, received the approval of six Justices, includ-
ing Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsberg,
and Breyer.' 01 Before addressing with the question of constitutionality,
the Court proceeded to discuss the interests involved for each side of
the controversy.
1. The Interests of Each Party
The Supreme Court first identified the interests of the petitioners
as "sidewalk counselors". The sidewalk counselors pointed out that
the restriction affected by Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122 created a speech-
free zone "encompass[ing] all the public ways within 100 feet of every
entrance to every health care facility everywhere in the State of Colo-
rado.'102 Next the petitioners asserted that all of their activities as side-
walk counselors, including passing out leaflets, displaying signs, and
orally communicating, were protected by the First Amendment, regard-
less of the message's offensiveness.10 3 In addition, the petitioners
93. Id. at 1257.
94. Id. at 1258.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1259.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Hill v. Colorado, 527 U.S. 1068 (1999).
100. 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2484 (2000).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2488.
103. Id. at 2488-89.
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stated that the areas affected by Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122 included
locations that demanded a high level of scrutiny in order to restrict
speech, in that sidewalks and streets have been consistently regarded
as traditional public forums.'0 4 Finally, the petitioners maintained that
their ability to communicate effectively would be lessened tremen-
dously by the enforcement of the statute's provisions.10 5
The Supreme Court then delineated the interests of the State of
Colorado. Primarily, the State was concerned with exercising its
"police powers to protect the health and safety of [its] citizens."'1 6 Par-
ticularly in this case, the respondents were concerned with "unim-
peded access to health care facilities and the avoidance of potential
trauma to patients associated with confrontational protests."107 The
Court further discussed the nature of the right to free speech, stating
that a message cannot be curtailed for the sole reason of its offensive-
ness.10 8 However, the Court limited the refuge allowed for offensive
speech, citing Frisby v. Schultz: "the protection afforded to offensive
messages does not always embrace offensive speech that is so intrusive
that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it."10 9 In recognizing this lim-
itation, the Supreme Court concluded that even in a public forum,
there might exist a right of privacy allowing citizens to quiet speech
which constituted unwanted communication." 0 The Court referred to
this phenomenon as the "right to be let alone". 1 ' The Supreme Court
concluded that the right to be let alone was implicit in the Colorado
statute, along with the "right of passage without obstruction".112
2. Content Neutrality
The Supreme Court accepted and commented on the determina-
tion by the four previous lower state court opinions that Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 18-9-122 was a content-neutral statute. 113 The Court con-
cluded that the regulation was content-neutral because it was not a
regulation of speech, but instead was a restriction on the places speech
could occur." 4 Also, the Court found that the statute was "not
104. Id. at 2489.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2489.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2490.
113. Id. at 2491.
114. Id.
130 [Vol. 23:117
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adopted because of disagreement with the message [the speech] con-
vey[ed]" and "appl[ied] equally to all demonstrators regardless of view-
point". 1 5 The statute's content-neutrality was further established by
the lack of a relation between the State of Colorado's interest in safe
access and privacy and the content of the sidewalk counselors'
speech. 1 6 Petitioners argued that Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122 was con-
tent-based because the content of the protestors' speech (whether it
consisted of "oral protest, education or counseling"), coupled with
proximity, determined whether a protestor was in violation of the law.
Rejecting this argument, the Court stated that the statute did not pro-
hibit a particular viewpoint or subject matter. 1 1 7 In addition, the
Supreme Court majority opinion addressed the concerns of two dis-
senting Justices by rejecting the argument that legislation motivated by
partisan concerns was necessarily content-based." 8
3. Valid Time, Place, and Manner Restriction
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the
lower courts that the appropriate test for the constitutionality of the
statute was the Ward test for time, place and manner restrictions." 9 As
the Court had previously discussed the statute's content-neutrality and
the significance of the government's interests, the analysis moved on to
the questions of narrow tailoring and ample alternative channels of
communication. The Supreme Court found the Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-
9-122 to be narrowly tailored, in that the restrictions on speech
occurred at the very location where the problem existed-outside abor-
tion clinics.' 2 ° In addition, although the statute was not the least
restrictive means of serving the state's goal, because it was a content-
neutral regulation that did not "foreclose any means of communica-
115. Id.
116. Id. The Supreme Court found this mismatch between the purpose of the
statute and the protestors' speech content to be evidence the statute "was not adopted
'because of disagreement with the message it conveys.' . . . This conclusion is
supported by the State Supreme Court's . . . holding that the statute's 'restrictions
apply equally to all demonstrators, regardless of viewpoint, and the statutory language
makes no reference to the content of the speech'." Id. (quoting Hill v. Thomas, 973
P.2d 1246, 1256 (Colo. 1999)).
117. Id. at 2493.
118. Id. at 2494. The Court stated: "[Tihe contention that a statute is 'viewpoint
based' simply because its enactment was motivated by the conduct of partisans on one
side of a debate is without support."
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2497.
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tion", the statute satisfied the narrow tailoring requirement. 12 1 Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122 also allowed ample alternative methods of com-
munication although it restricted speech, due to the fact that the dis-
play of signs was still an available method of protest.'22 In addition,
the Court noted that the sidewalk counselors' ability to pass out leaf-
lets or communicate orally, although lessened, was still available to a
large extent. 123 The statute forbade approach within the floating buffer
zone, but did not outlaw standing passively while handing out leaflets,
or orally communicating outside the eight-foot zone. Because the
Court found that the statute allowed ample alternative methods of
communication and was narrowly tailored, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122
was held by the Court to have met all the requirements of the Ward
test, and therefore was deemed a constitutional time, place, and man-
ner restriction. 12 4
4. Not Overbroad, Vague, or a Prior Restraint
The Supreme Court dealt the final blow to the petitioners by
rejecting petitioners' three additional arguments. First, the petitioners
claimed the statute was overbroad as enacted in that it restricted too
much speech. 125 This overbreadth argument was based on the theory
that the statute "protect[ed] too many people in too many places,
rather than just the patients at the facilities where confrontational
speech had occurred," and restricted all speakers, regardless of their
past peaceful conduct.' 2 6 The Supreme Court dismissed petitioners'
overbreadth argument, stating that a statute of general application was
intended to cover many situations.127 The Court even found the
breadth of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122 to be further evidence that the
statute was not content-based. 128 The petitioners' attempt to persuade
the Court of the statute's unconstitutionality as an overbroad restric-
tion failed.' 2 9
Next, the Court addressed the sidewalk counselors' claim that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague. The petitioners argued that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague because of the ambiguous mean-
121. Id. at 2494.
122. Id. at 2494-95.
123. Id. at 2495.
124. Id. at 2497.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2498.
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ing and lack of definitions for terms within the statute. 130 These dis-
puted terms included "protest, education, or counseling", "consent",
and "approach"."' To determine whether a statute is unconstitution-
ally vague, the Court employs a two-part inquiry. The Court asks first
whether the language of the statute fails to provide people of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand the prohibited
conduct; and second, whether the statute's language authorizes or
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' 32 In regard to
the first question, the Court determined that the words used in the
statute would be ascribed their common meaning. 133 Under the sec-
ond part of the test, the Court held that the scienter requirement pro-
tected unwitting violators from prosecution, so the statute could not be
designated as a kind of trap for the unwary. 3 4 The petitioner sidewalk
counselors offered several hypothetical situations testing the vagueness
of the statute and difficulties with its application, 135 but these hypo-
thetical theories were rejected by the Court as being inappropriate for a
facial attack on a statute's constitutionality. 136 Also, the Supreme
Court found that the statute, although allowing a degree of judgment
by enforcement officials, did not encourage arbitrary prosecution. 137
Thus, the Court rejected the petitioners' claim Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-
122 was unconstitutionally vague.'13
Finally, the Supreme Court answered in the negative the sidewalk
counselors' claim that the statute constituted a prior restraint on
speech. 139 The Court held that the statute's consent requirement did
not prohibit speech or create the possibility of a heckler's veto; it
merely limited the places where protest could occur. 1 40 Also, the Court
correctly stated that all previous findings by the Court of prior
restraint were found in government licensing schemes, while the con-
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2498-99.
138. Id. at 2499.
139. Id.
140. Id. The Supreme Court stated: "[Tihis statute does not provide for a 'heckler's
veto' but rather allows every speaker to engage freely in any expressive activity
communicating all messages and viewpoints subject only to the narrow place
requirement imbedded within the 'approach' restriction."
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sent requirement here was to be enforced by private citizens. 141 In this
light, the Court held that the statute was not an unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech, as it was not official or government censorship. 142
The Supreme Court concluded by affirming the Colorado
Supreme Court in denying the petitioners' request for an injunction
against the enforcement of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122.143
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Content-Based
The Supreme Court refused to apply a standard of strict scrutiny
in analyzing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122, but instead chose to use a
content-neutral standard. If the Supreme Court had found the statute
to be content-based, it would have applied strict scrutiny, meaning the
statute would carry a presumption of unconstitutionality. In order to
preserve the statute under this level of scrutiny, the State of Colorado
would have to prove that the statute was narrowly tailored to accom-
plish a compelling governmental interest. Instead of applying strict
scrutiny (which probably would have invalidated the statute), the
Court dismissed petitioners' argument that the statute was content-
based, grounding their holding upon the theory that the statute simply
limited places where speech could occur.144 However, the Court's argu-
ment regarding the place regulation overlooks one important facet of
the petitioners' case. The area immediately outside an abortion clinic
is, practically speaking, the only location where antiabortion protest
can effectively occur. 14 5 The issue of abortion has largely been decided
from a political standpoint for more than twenty years. The people the
petitioners wish to reach the most, women seeking abortions, are gath-
ered in no other readily identifiable and available location to be
exposed to the sidewalk counselors' protests. 146 In short, if antiabor-
tion protestors cannot expound their message outside an abortion
clinic, their message may be, for lack of effectiveness, lost. 147
In addition, the Supreme Court found Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122
content-neutral due to the fact that this legislation was not enacted
because of disagreement with the content of the protestors' message, or
at least the purpose of the statute was not related to a particular mes-
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2491.
145. Id. at 2514-15.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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sage. 148 By answering the petitioners' claim in this manner, the Court
overlooked the language of the statute itself, which identifies its pur-
pose in balancing "the exercise of a person's right to protest or counsel
against certain medical procedures . . .,14 as opposed to the right to
obtain medical services. If a statute is designed to reach only those
people who are seeking to protest a medical procedure, then obviously
the statute does not apply to any positive or pro-medical procedure
viewpoints. The statute itself is only addressing, and therefore,
restricting those speakers who espouse a negative viewpoint against
some form of medical services. When applied in the context of the
location restriction, as well as the history of the legislation, one can
only come to the logical conclusion that Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122,
for all practical purposes, will only serve to restrict antiabortion
protestors.
The statute also fails to prohibit approach for reasons other than
protest, education, or counseling. If the true purpose of § 18-9-122
was to ensure access to clinics or promote public safety, why is the
restriction on approach limited to people wishing to communicate in
these manners? A person approaching an abortion clinic client wishing
to chat about the latest Colorado Rockies game, the weather, or the
Monica Lewinsky scandal would be allowed to enter the eight-foot
floating buffer zone, with no applicable penalty according to the stat-
ute. Yet, this hypothetical person could prevent access to a clinic
entrance just as easily as someone counseling or protesting could pre-
vent access to a clinic entrance. However, only persons protesting or
attempting to educate or counsel these potential abortion clinic clients
can be prosecuted under the current statute. When the statute is ana-
lyzed in this fashion, the Supreme Court's finding of content-neutrality
becomes even more questionable. As Justice Scalia stated in his dis-
sent from the majority opinion, "This Colorado law is no more targeted
at used car salesmen, animal rights activists, fund raisers, environmen-
talists and missionaries than French vagrancy law was targeted at the
rich."150 The statute is based on suppression of antiabortion speech,
and as a content-based restriction, should be struck down as a viola-
tion of the First Amendment's freedom of speech.
148. Id.
149. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-122(1)(1999) (emphasis added).
150. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. at 2504 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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B. Overbreadth
The Supreme Court dismissed the petitioners' overbreadth argu-
ment with little analysis, stating simply that it was a statute of general
applicability. However, in order to determine whether a statute is over-
broad, the Court has traditionally examined whether the restriction on
speech matches the precise concern for which the statute was
enacted. 1 5 1 Here, the State claimed that the regulation of speech was
necessary to protect a "person's right to obtain medical counseling and
treatment in an unobstructed manner."'152 This language signifies a
concern with access to medical clinics, or perhaps with public safety
or crowd control. However, the statute restricts speech based on lack
of consent, 153 which has no connection with access or safety. There-
fore, the evil intended to be regulated against does not match the effect
of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122.'15 This result creates a presumption of
overbreadth in most cases in which First Amendment rights are
involved, primarily due to the government's tendency to restrict free
speech while paying lip service to other public policy goals. In
NAACP v. Button, the Court stated: "Broad prophylactic rules in the
area of free expression are suspect .... Precision of regulation must
be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious
freedoms." 155 Although the restriction embedded in Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-9-122 may further the goal of ensured access to medical facilities,
or increase the assurance of public safety, there remains an "insuffi-
cient nexus" 156 between the regulation of the speech involved and the
identified government interest. This dissonance between purpose and
effect leads to the conclusion that more speech will be regulated than
is necessary to achieve the government's goal. As such, the petitioners'
requested injunction against the enforcement of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-
9-122 should have been granted because the statute is unconstitution-
ally overbroad.
In addition to the lack of connection between stated purpose and
effect, it must be considered that under the terms of Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-9-122, the eight-foot "consent" buffer zone attaches to every per-
son within one hundred feet of every medical clinic throughout the
State of Colorado. 157 This zone appears regardless of the person's
151. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1968).
152. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-122 (1) (1999).
153. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-122 (3) (1999).
154. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 2513. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 2513-14.
157. Id. at 2510.
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intent to enter or not to enter a medical clinic. If an individual is walk-
ing along the sidewalk in front of a doctor's office, with no intention of
stepping inside, why should First Amendment freedoms be violated to
protect his safety? Under the Court's ruling in this case, no one can
counsel this hypothetical pedestrian on the appropriate type of shoes
to wear while running a marathon, educate him about the local eve-
ning news broadcast, or protest the availability of nuclear missiles in
the former Soviet Union within eight feet of the pedestrian without his
consent. A broad restriction on speech, brought to bear according to
the statute to such a large pool of individuals and situations, becomes
almost ridiculous in its breadth of application. A statute with effects
that reach so far beyond its intended result cannot stand as
constitutional.
C. Not Reasonable Time, Place or Manner Restriction
Even if one accepts the Supreme Court's finding of content-neu-
trality, and agrees with the application of the Ward test to determine
the statute's constitutionality as a time, place, and manner restriction,
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122 must still be held unconstitutional.
The first requirement of the Ward test states that a regulation
upon speech cannot "burden substantially more speech than neces-
sary to further the government's legitimate interests" or must be "nar-
rowly tailored".1 58 By including every medical facility in the State of
Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122 creates an area of protection
against speech far larger than is necessary to protect and ensure access
to medical facilities. Not every medical facility hosts a gaggle of protes-
tors outside its doors. Not every person within one hundred feet of a
medical clinic is afraid that the approach of a stranger may interfere
with his ability to enter the clinic. While the Supreme Court praises
the depth and breadth of the statute as proof it is not content-based,
the Court overlooks the extent of forbidden speech in situations totally
foreign to the purpose for which the statute was enacted.1 5 9 If the stat-
ute is designed "to protect distraught women who are embarrassed,
vexed, or harassed as they attempt to enter abortion clinics ... [these
acts] should be prohibited in those terms."'160 Given that the statute
regulates far more speech than necessary to protect any of the State of
Colorado's asserted interests, it is not narrowly tailored, and therefore
fails the Ward test for constitutionality.
158. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 791, 799 (1989).
159. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. at 2522 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 2522.
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In addition, the Ward test requires that a content-neutral regula-
tion leave open "ample alternative channels" for speech. 161 In Frisby v.
Schultz, the Supreme Court declared that the injunction at issue in that
controversy allowed for ample alternative channels of communication
because it "permit[ted] the more general dissemination of a message to
the targeted audience.' 1 62 However, as the Hill petitioners claimed
here, the targeted audience they wished to reach is unavailable except
in the very location the sidewalk counselors are restrained from using
for protest. Justice Kennedy stated in his dissent that "[d]oor-to-door
distributions or mass mailing or telephone campaigns are not effective
alternative avenues of 'communication for petitioners .... [T]he stat-
ute strips petitioners of using speech in the time, place, and manner
most vital to the protected expression."' 63 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122
fails to leave open ample effective alternative channels for antiabortion
speech, and therefore does not meet the Ward test for constitutionality
of a time, place, and manner restriction.
D. Vagueness
In addition to the aforementioned problems with Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-9-122, the statute leads to many difficulties because it is vague.
One of the most difficult questions regarding Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-
122 is how to effectively and fairly enforce the consent requirement
embedded within it. According to the statute, the consent of an indi-
vidual is required in order to avoid criminal prosecution for an
approach within eight feet of a person who has entered the 100-foot
buffer zone around a medical clinic. This raises concerns about com-
mon human interaction. How will a protestor be able to determine
whether consent has been given? How will a client approaching a medi-
cal facility know that an individual (such as a sidewalk counselor)
requires the client's consent before the client may be approached?
There are no answers to these practical enforcement difficulties con-
tained within the Supreme Court's opinion or lower court opinions.
However, because criminal prosecution under the statute depends on a
lack of consent, the issue is of the most vital importance.
In addition to the consent difficulty, the question of compliance
with the floating buffer zone remains unanswered. The Supreme
Court contended that the scienter requirement ("knowingly") would
protect an individual from an unintended violation of the statute. 164
161. See Ward, 491 U.S. 791.
162. 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988).
163. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. at 2524.
164. Id. at 2498.
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However, the Court fails to respond to the basic concern expressed by
the petitioners. In a highly emotional and often crowded situation, it
will be difficult for any person, even those with the best intentions of
complying with the regulation, to accurately estimate and maintain an
eight-foot distance while continuing their speech. Are these individu-
als to be prosecuted if their estimation is off by one foot? This uncer-
tainty about the common application of the most basic facet of the
legislation could restrict speech in an even broader manner. Out of
fear of prosecution, antiabortion protestors will maintain 10-foot, 15-
foot, or even 20-foot distances from those entering medical clinics. In
its application, therefore, the statute will have a chilling effect upon
speech that the statute it was not intended to reach. The Supreme
Court, in the majority opinion, did not adequately deal with this
problem.
E. Public Policy
An additional public policy issue concerns the need for a statute
such as Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122 to ensure access to medical clinics.
Why is it necessary to create a statute that restricts First Amendment
freedoms when other means exist of accomplishing the State of Colo-
rado's goal? The Federal Access to Clinic Entrances Act comes to
mind. The precedent of this federal legislation established a model for
states that wished to provide further protection for their citizens'
access to medical services. Yet, the FACE Act, while providing the pro-
tection sought by the Colorado General Assembly, did not restrict
speech in any manner. In addition to the FACE Act, there are several
common law tort or criminal causes of action to protect those entering
medical clinics, including the law of trespass, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, assault, battery, and false imprisonment. 165 None
of these actions restrict speech, yet could be applied to discourage
interference with access to medical facilities. The fact that the Colo-
rado General Assembly saw the need to bypass these traditional and
readily enforceable remedies to remove the petitioners' ability to exer-
cise their free speech rights speaks volumes about the true purpose of
this statute. As far as Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122 creates restrictions
upon speech when current law could be applied to resolve the State's
concerns, it represents bad public policy as a duplicative and overly
restrictive regulation.
165. Id. at 2522.
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F. Implications
The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Hill v. Colorado consti-
tutes a major change in the history of First Amendment jurisprudence.
For the first time, the Supreme Court has recognized a citizen's ability
to silence speech on the basis of his disagreement with its content in a
traditional public forum. The Court refers to this ability as the "right
to be let alone". 166 This reduced protection of free speech contravenes
Supreme Court precedent in many First Amendment cases. For exam-
ple, in Cohen v. California, the Court stated that if offensive speech
occurred in a public forum, the burden was on the members of the
audience to avert their eyes or otherwise ignore the offensiveness of the
speech. 167 The only location in which the Court has previously recog-
nized this so-called "right to be let alone" is in the privacy of one's own
home. 168 Thus, the Supreme Court extended the right to be let alone
in one's home to an unwilling listener in a traditional public forum.
1 6 9
The implications of this new "right" boggle the mind. Perhaps, if
stretched to its maximum application, the ability of a citizen to avoid
unpopular speech in a traditional public forum could signal the death
of First Amendment freedoms, although it is unlikely that such a fla-
grant disregard for First Amendment protections will be propounded
by the Supreme Court. In the area of protest speech, however, there
may be significant changes in the ability of speakers to "force" their
ideas upon unwilling listeners. The most obvious application of this
new right is within the subject matter of the Hill controversy.
Antiabortion protestors across the nation may find protesting in tradi-
tional methods to be criminalized if unwanted (which is usually the
case). This restriction, based on the right to be let alone, may sound
the death knell for antiabortion speech as we know it.
It is possible that the new "right to be let alone" could be used to
solve some of the stickiest constitutional conundrums we face as Amer-
icans. For example, the right to be let alone, if expanded and duly
recognized, could be used to curtail hate speech. Certainly the town of
Skokie, Illinois would find this result agreeable! 170 Indeed, if a person
disagreed with the message delivered as hate speech (which by its lit-
eral definition is probable), that person, under a statute that recog-
166. Id. at 2489.
167. See 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
168. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988); Rowan v. United States Post
Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
169. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. at 2508-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. See National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); Collin v. Smith, 447
F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
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nized the right to be let alone in a public forum, might prosecute a Ku
Klux Klan member for addressing him in an unwanted fashion on a
public street.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court, in its disposition of Hill v. Colo-
rado, ignored several major flaws in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122.
Indeed, the statute could have been declared unconstitutional on its
face for several reasons: its overbreadth, its basis on content, and its
invalidity as a time, place, and manner restriction. Nevertheless, the
statute stands as a defensive coup for abortion patients and supporters
in Colorado. The effects of the Hill case reach far beyond one state,
however, due to the Court's introduction of a new right. The "right to
be let alone", whether one disagrees with its invention or not, will have
drastic consequences on the future of protest speech, particularly in
the antiabortion protest area. Whether the "right to be let alone" will
be utilized in other questionable areas of constitutional doctrine
remains to be seen, but one can only hope the creation of this new
"right" does not symbolize the end of a traditional freedom.
Christy E. Wilhelm
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